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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Steven Metro appeals from the 46-month sentence of 
imprisonment imposed by the District Court as a consequence 
of his guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to violate federal 
securities laws and one count of insider trading.  He contends 
that the Court wrongly attributed to him illicit financial gains 
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actually attributable to someone with whom he was not acting 
in concert and to whom he did not provide inside information.  
Because the District Court’s factual findings are insufficient to 
support the sentence, we will vacate and remand for 
resentencing. 
 
I. Background1 
 
A.  The Insider Trading Scheme 
 
Metro, a former managing clerk at a prominent New 
York City law firm, engaged in a five-year insider trading 
scheme in which he abused his position at the firm by 
disclosing material nonpublic information to his close friend 
Frank Tamayo.  The pattern of Metro’s criminal activity 
remained fairly constant throughout the multi-year scheme.  
Between February 2009 and January 2013, he used his position 
at the law firm to obtain material nonpublic information 
concerning thirteen distinct corporate transactions.  In each 
instance, after obtaining the inside information, he would meet 
with Tamayo and tell him which stocks to purchase and when.  
Tamayo would then write down the stock symbols of the 
companies whose stock he was about to acquire.   
 
 After Tamayo left those meetings with Metro, he would 
call his personal stockbroker, Vladimir Eydelman, and arrange 
to meet him, typically at Grand Central Station.  Tamayo 
would show Eydelman the stock symbols he had written down 
                                              
1  The facts that follow are drawn from the record that 
was before the District Court at sentencing.  They are not in 
dispute, unless otherwise noted below. 
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and Eydelman would commit them to memory.  Tamayo would 
then tell Eydelman when to make the trades.  
 
Eydelman made such trades not only for Tamayo but 
also on behalf of himself, his family, his friends, and other 
brokerage clients.  Metro, by and large, did not hold the 
involved stocks himself and did not collect proceeds from the 
trades.  Rather, he relied on Tamayo to reinvest the proceeds 
from their unlawful trades in future insider trading.  When all 
was said and done, the insider trading by Eydelman, Tamayo, 
and Metro, based on Metro’s tips, resulted in illicit gains of 
$5,673,682.  The District Court attributed that entire sum to 
Metro in determining the length of his sentence.   
 
Metro denies being aware of Eydelman’s existence until 
one year after he relayed his last tip to Tamayo, and he 
contends that he never intended any of the tips he provided to 
Tamayo to be passed to a broker or any other third party.   
 
B.  Tamayo Cooperates with the Government 
The trading activity based on Metro’s inside 
information did not go unnoticed by the government.  
Eventually, an investigation was launched and government 
agents executed a search warrant at Tamayo’s home in or 
around December 2013.  Tamayo promptly admitted his role 
in the scheme and began cooperating with the government.  
That cooperation included recording a January 28, 2014, 
meeting with Metro in which Metro expressed his desire to 
liquidate some of the gains that had accrued since 2009, so he 
could fund a real estate transaction.  Tamayo responded that he 
had asked his stockbroker – who was unnamed in the 
conversation – to help liquidate some of the assets held in 
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Tamayo’s retirement account.  A portion of that conversation 
follows, as set forth in a transcript created by the government 
and provided to the District Court. 
 
TAMAYO: [M]y stock broker . . . I also asked him to 
see if he can get me, like, 30K for you. Um, because I 
know you, um, so that might help. 
 
[METRO]: That would help, yeah. Yeah, that would 
help. 
 
TAMAYO: But, you know, because I know that he [the 
stock broker], obviously, has to, you know, in order to, 
uh, you know, to make everything look kosher, he 
passed it [the Inside Information] to a couple of his 
clients, you know. 
 
[METRO]: Okay. 
 
TAMAYO: So I said to him [the stock broker], um, I 
said, listen, is there any way you can give me like 30K, 
‘cause I can’t take it out of my, you know, because all 
that money is tied up in my retirement. 
 
[METRO]: Right, sure, sure, right. 
 
TAMAYO: So he [the stock broker] said, he’s thinking 
about it. I’m actually going to meet with him again, um, 
you know like Monday or Tuesday of next week. And 
then he’s gonna, he’s gonna see if he can get me cash. 
 
[METRO]: Alright. 
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TAMAYO: So that should be good. 
 
[METRO]: That works. Yeah, that totally works. 
 
… 
 
TAMAYO: If I get my broker to give you, you know, at 
least 30K, you know, we’ll take it off the. . . 
 
[METRO]: Right, right. 
 
TAMAYO: . . . the, uh, the 168 [[Metro’s] accrued 
share of the insider trading profits], there, so. Um, 
alright, so, let’s see . . . 
 
[METRO]: Yeah, because we’re all cashed out at this 
point, right? 
 
TAMAYO: Yeah. 
 
[METRO]: We’re not holding anything. 
 
TAMAYO: No, do you, um . . . 
 
[METRO]: But I’m going to . . . if I can’t use the money, 
I’m not going to leave that money there, doing nothing. 
 
TAMAYO: Uh hum. Yeah, . . . um . . . 
 
[METRO]: You know what I mean? That doesn’t make 
sense to me. . . 
 
TAMAYO: Yeah, I mean, it’s been a while, right? 
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[METRO]: For us, it’s been a long time. But, I’m just 
saying even if . . . 
 
TAMAYO: No, no, as far as the last one we did [the last 
insider trading]. 
 
[METRO]: Yeah, yeah. Like a year, or kind of a little 
bit . . . but I’m not even saying that, I’m saying a legit 
thing. Because why not, I mean, that money should be 
making me money, rather than just sitting in a cash 
value. 
 
TAMAYO: Absolutely. Um, he actually, the broker 
actually asked me about it—he’s like, anything new? I 
was like, no, you know, so. 
 
[METRO]: But those tips, they really don’t pay off. I 
mean they pay off for us, but, what good is giving him 
[the stock broker] a tip? 
 
TAMAYO: I know. 
 
[METRO]: It’s not making me any money. 
 
TAMAYO: Yeah, but you know the thing is that, it’s 
good because, it actually, you know, covers up a little 
bit, that’s all. 
 
[METRO]: Yeah, no, it’s true. But you think he [the 
stock broker] would kick you something for the [tips]. 
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TAMAYO: I know, absolutely. He might be the 
cheapest bastard around. 
 
(App. at 175-77 (non-italicized alterations in original).) 
 
Metro also told Tamayo during that conversation that 
“[i]f anything comes up, I’ll let you know about it for sure.”  
(Presentence Report ¶ 97.)  The government arrested Metro 
less than two months after that meeting.   
 
C.  The Presentence Report and Metro’s 
 Objections 
 
After he was caught, Metro pled guilty to conspiracy to 
violate the securities laws2 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and 
insider trading in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78ff.  
The Presentence Report (“PSR”) set forth an analysis of 
Metro’s sentencing exposure under the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or “guidelines”).  
Specifically, the PSR applied § 2B1.4 of the guidelines, the 
provision relevant to insider trading, to calculate the offense 
level that would determine, in part, the appropriate sentencing 
range.  Pursuant to that section, Metro’s base offense level was 
8.  Because the gain resulting from his conduct exceeded 
$6,500, the guidelines, under § 2B1.4(b)(1), called for an 
“increase by the number of levels from the table in § 2B1.1[.]”  
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.4(b)(1).  As the PSR attributed all $5.6 million 
in illicit gains to Metro, an 18-level increase was directed by § 
                                              
2  The indictment charged Metro with conspiracy to 
commit securities and tender offer fraud.  For ease of reference, 
we describe that charge throughout this opinion as a conspiracy 
to violate the securities laws. 
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2B1.1(b)(1)(J).  An additional 2-level increase pursuant to § 
3B1.2 was added because Metro had abused his position of 
trust as an employee with management responsibilities at the 
law firm.  Finally, because Metro pled guilty and 
acknowledged his criminal behavior, the PSR credited him 
with accepting responsibility and hence allowed a 3-level 
reduction in his offense level, pursuant to § 3E1.1(a) and (b).  
Based on a total offense level of 25 and Metro’s criminal 
history category of I, the recommended guidelines range was 
57 to 71 months of imprisonment.   
 
Metro objected to the attribution to him of all the gains 
realized as a result of Eydelman’s trades.  He argued in a 
presentence filing with the District Court that he was not, in the 
language of commentary to guidelines § 2B1.4, “acting in 
concert” with Eydelman such that Eydelman’s gains should be 
attributed to him for purposes of sentencing.3   
 
D.  Sentencing Hearing and Sentence 
 
At the sentencing hearing, Metro renewed his objection 
to the PSR’s 18-level enhancement based on all $5.6 million of 
illicit gains from the scheme.  In response, the government 
described for the District Court its theory of the case: namely, 
that this was “a three-party scheme[,]” with Metro as the 
insider, Tamayo as the middleman, and Eydelman as the 
stockbroker.  (App. at 79.)  After the District Court asked 
whether the law requires that Metro “know of Mr. Eydelman 
in order to have” responsibility for Eydelman’s gains, the 
                                              
3  Metro also objected to the abuse of position of trust 
enhancement.  The District Court’s resolution of that objection 
is not a subject of this appeal.   
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government answered that the law only requires that Metro 
“know that there is somebody else that is obtaining the inside 
information that he is passing on.  And [the government has] 
to show that all three gentlemen were acting in concert.”  (App. 
at 81-82.)  The government then argued that it had met those 
requirements because Eydelman, the ultimate recipient of 
Metro’s tips, was critical to the insider trading, and that the 
January 28, 2014, conversation demonstrated Metro’s 
awareness of Eydelman’s existence.   
 
Metro disputed the government’s characterization of the 
January 28 conversation, arguing that it did not support a 
finding that he had acted in concert with Eydelman because the 
conversation took place one year after the last time Metro 
provided an inside tip.  According to Metro, he first learned 
that a broker (i.e., Eydelman) was involved with the scheme 
shortly before that conversation, and no fair interpretation of 
his responses shows that he had been aware of Eydelman when 
he (Metro) was passing information to Tamayo.   
 
The District Court overruled Metro’s objection to the 
PSR’s attribution of the full $5.6 million to him.  Without 
making any explicit factual findings on the record, the Court 
stated that “[t]he commentary [to § 2B1.4] unequivocally 
attributes all the gains made by Tamayo and Eydelman to 
Metro. …  So with that, the Court also finds that United States 
v. Kluger, 722 F.3d 549 (3d Cir. 2013) is also on point and 
analogous[.]”4  (App. at 97.) 
 
                                              
4  As more fully discussed herein, Kluger deals with the 
attribution, for sentencing purposes, of insider trading gains.  
722 F.3d at 557. 
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When handing down Metro’s sentence, the District 
Court used the PSR’s guideline imprisonment range of 57 to 
71 months as a starting point.  It then granted a two-level 
downward variance because of Metro’s “strong family ties” 
and “redeemable qualities,” resulting in a guideline 
imprisonment range of 46 to 57 months.  The Court sentenced 
Metro to a 46-month term of imprisonment, a three-year term 
of supervised release, a $10,000 fine, and a $200 special 
assessment.  Metro now appeals that sentence. 
 
II. Discussion5 
 
 The District Court rightly looked to the insider trading-
specific guideline, § 2B1.4, in sentencing Metro.  As already 
noted, that section provides for a base offense level of 8, and 
then says that “[i]f the gain resulting from the offense exceeded 
$6,500, increase by the number of levels from the table in § 
2B1.1 … .”  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.4(b)(1).  The commentary to the 
section explains that: 
 
… Insider trading is treated essentially as a 
sophisticated fraud. Because the victims and 
their losses are difficult if not impossible to 
identify, the gain, i.e., the total increase in value 
realized through trading in securities by the 
defendant and persons acting in concert with the 
defendant or to whom the defendant provided 
inside information, is employed instead of the 
victims’ losses. 
                                              
5  The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742(a)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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U.S.S.G. § 2B1.4 cmt. background (emphasis added).  Relying 
on that commentary, the District Court attributed to Metro all 
of the gains realized from Eydelman’s illegal trades, which 
amounted to approximately $5.6 million.  Metro argues that the 
Court failed to make sufficient factual findings to support that 
attribution and gave too broad a meaning to the phrase “acting 
in concert.”  We agree. 
 
A.  General Principles and Kluger 
 
 “[W]e review the District Court’s interpretation of the 
Sentencing Guidelines de novo,” its “findings of fact for clear 
error[,]” and its “application of the Guidelines to facts for 
abuse of discretion.”  Kluger, 722 F.3d at 555 (citations 
omitted).  The federal sentencing guidelines are to be 
understood according to their “plain and unambiguous 
language[.]”  Id. at 556 (quoting United States v. Wong, 3 F.3d 
667, 670 (3d Cir. 1993)).  Commentary interpreting or 
explaining a specific guideline “is authoritative unless it 
violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent 
with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.”  Stinson 
v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993).  A failure to properly 
calculate a guidelines range is a “significant procedural error.”  
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).  Accordingly, 
“the use of an erroneous … range will typically require 
reversal[.]”  United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 215 (3d 
Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 214 
(3d Cir. 2010) (“If the district court commits procedural error, 
our preferred course is to remand the case for re-sentencing, 
without going any further.”). 
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 With those general principles in mind, we turn to a 
review of our decision in United States v. Kluger, which 
features prominently in the District Court’s decision and the 
parties’ arguments on appeal. 
 
 Kluger involved an insider trading scheme that, like the 
one here, had an insider at a law firm disclosing material 
nonpublic information to a middleman who, in turn, relayed 
that information to a stockbroker who ultimately executed the 
illegal trades.  722 F.3d at 553-54.  At sentencing, the district 
court attributed to the law firm insider all of the gains realized 
by the stockbroker, even though the insider argued that those 
gains were not foreseeable because the stockbroker traded “in 
share volumes far in excess of the number of shares that the … 
conspirators agreed would be traded.”  Id. at 554.  On appeal, 
the insider challenged the district court’s gain analysis by 
arguing that the foreseeability test set out in § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) 
should have lowered the “gain” attributed to him.  Id. at 557.  
Under the version of the guidelines in effect at the time the 
defendant was sentenced, § 1B1.3(a)(1) stated: 
 
(a)  …  Unless otherwise specified, (i) the base 
offense level where the guideline specifies more 
than one base offense level, (ii) specific offense 
characteristics and (iii) cross references in 
Chapter Two, and (iv) adjustments in Chapter 
Three, shall be determined on the basis of the 
following: 
 
(1)(A)  all acts and omissions committed, aided, 
abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, 
procured, or willfully caused by the defendant; 
and 
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(B)  in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal 
activity (a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or 
enterprise undertaken by the defendant in 
concert with others, whether or not charged as a 
conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts and 
omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly 
undertaken criminal activity[.] 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1) (2010) (emphasis added).  In affirming 
the district court’s gain calculation, we determined that “the 
insider-trading guideline falls under the ‘unless otherwise 
specified’ exception of § 1B1.3,” such that § 1B1.3’s 
foreseeability test does not apply to the gain analysis required 
by § 2B1.4’s commentary.  Kluger, 722 F.3d at 558-59.  We 
reached that conclusion because that gain analysis 
“unequivocally attributes” to a defendant all the gains realized 
through trading by individuals “acting in concert with the 
defendant” or “to whom the defendant provided inside 
information,” without regard to the foreseeability of those 
gains.  Id. at 558 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2B1.4 cmt. background).  
Critical to our conclusion in Kluger was the defendant’s 
admission that he was “acting in concert with” the stockbroker 
and that he “provided inside information” with the intent that 
it reach the stockbroker.  Id.6  Metro, in contrast, strenuously 
                                              
 6  We emphasized those facts four separate times in 
Kluger.  See 722 F.3d at 558 (“[The stockbroker] was a 
‘person[] acting in concert with the defendant,’ as well as one 
‘to whom the defendant provided inside information.’” 
(citation omitted)); id. at 559 n.13 (“[W]e observe that it is 
undisputed that [the defendant] passed inside information to 
[the middleman] with the intent that the information would 
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disputes that he either acted “in concert with” or “provided 
inside information” to Eydelman.   
 
B. Kluger Did Not Render § 1B1.3 Irrelevant for 
Purposes of Determining the Scope of 
Conduct for Which a Defendant Can Be Held 
Accountable at Sentencing 
Adopting the approach taken in the PSR, the District 
Court concluded that Kluger controlled the sentencing 
outcome here.  That of course was also the government’s 
position, but the only evidence offered by the government to 
establish that Metro had any knowledge of Eydelman, or that 
Metro had any awareness that his insider tips were received by 
anyone other than Tamayo, was the January 28, 2014, 
transcript.  Metro objected throughout sentencing to the 
conclusion in the PSR that he acted “in concert with” or 
“provided inside information” to Eydelman, and he disputed 
that the January 28, 2014, transcript established that he had.  
The District Court, at Metro’s sentencing hearing, neither 
resolved those factual disputes nor made any other factual 
findings with regard to Metro’s relationship with, or 
knowledge of, Eydelman.  The Court appears to have 
                                              
reach [the stockbroker] who [the defendant] knew was a 
securities trader in order for [the stockbroker] to place illicit 
trades.”); id. at 561 (“[The stockbroker] is explicitly an 
individual ‘to whom the defendant provided inside 
information.’” (citation omitted)); id. at 561 n.19 (“[The 
defendant] intended [the stockbroker] to be the ultimate tippee 
because [the defendant] knew that [the middleman] would not 
exercise the vast majority of the trades on behalf of the 
conspirators.”). 
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concluded either that, in light of Kluger, Metro’s guilty plea to 
a conspiracy count naming Eydelman was a sufficient basis to 
establish the “in concert with” or the “provide inside 
information to” requirements for the attribution of gains, or 
that Kluger requires that courts hold tippers accountable at 
sentencing for all downstream trading resulting from that 
tipper’s inside information.  Both interpretations take Kluger 
too far. 
  
 Metro pled guilty to Count 1 of the indictment, which 
charged him with conspiring with “Tamayo, Eydelman, and 
others” to violate the securities laws.  (App. at 26.)  It is clear, 
however, that the guidelines do not consider a defendant’s 
criminal liability to be co-extensive with sentencing 
accountability.  The commentary to the guidelines’ “Relevant 
Conduct” provision, § 1B1.3, is explicit that “[t]he principles 
and limits of sentencing accountability under this guideline are 
not always the same as the principles and limits of criminal 
liability,” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. 1, and further that, “[b]ecause 
a count may be worded broadly and include the conduct of 
many participants over a period of time, the scope of” a 
defendant’s conduct for sentencing purposes “is not 
necessarily the same as the scope of the entire conspiracy,” 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. 3(B).  We have thus explained that the 
conduct a defendant is typically held responsible for under the 
guidelines “is not coextensive with conspiracy law.”  United 
States v. Mannino, 212 F.3d 835, 842 (3d Cir. 2000) (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting United States v. Collado, 975 F.2d 985, 997 
(3d Cir. 1992)).7  For that reason, we have instructed that, at 
                                              
 7  See also United States v. Getto, 729 F.3d 221, 234 
n.11 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he scope of conduct for which a 
defendant can be held accountable under the sentencing 
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sentencing, it is essential for courts to conduct “a searching and 
individualized inquiry into the circumstances surrounding each 
defendant’s involvement in [a] conspiracy … to ensure that the 
defendant’s sentence accurately reflects his or her role.”  
Collado, 975 F.2d at 995.  The question we are faced with now 
is whether those fundamental sentencing principles apply with 
equal force in the insider trading context, given our decision in 
Kluger, and the answer is they do. 
 
 Kluger does not mandate that § 1B1.3, and its guidance 
on the importance of individual accountability at sentencing, 
plays no role in determining the scope of a defendant’s relevant 
conduct in insider-trading conspiracy cases.  That case holds, 
rather, that § 1B1.3’s foreseeability requirement is inapplicable 
to an analysis of illicit gain under § 2B1.4.  See Kluger, 722 
F.3d at 558-59 (“[T]he insider-trading guideline falls under the 
                                              
guidelines is significantly narrower than the conduct embraced 
by the law of conspiracy.” (citation omitted)); United States v. 
Spotted Elk, 548 F.3d 641, 674 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he 
emphasis under § 1B1.3 is the scope of the individual 
defendant’s undertaking … rather than the scope of the 
conspiracy as a whole[.]”); William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. 
Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. Rev. 494, 510 (1990) 
[hereinafter Relevant Conduct] (explaining that in “concerted 
activity situations,” the guidelines attempted to create a 
sentencing rule that was “not necessarily co-extensive with … 
co-conspirator liability”).  At the time Relevant Conduct was 
published, Judge Wilkins was Chairman of the United States 
Sentencing Commission, and Steer was the Commission’s 
General Counsel.  Relevant Conduct, 41 S.C. L. Rev. at 495 
n.a & aa. 
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‘unless otherwise specified’ exception of § 1B1.3, and, as a 
result, we will not use the reasonable foreseeability test in 
reviewing the District Court’s calculation of the offense 
level[.]”); id. at 559 (“In the circumstances we should not look 
beyond the plain language of § 2B1.4 and read a foreseeability 
test into § 2B1.4.”).  The “unless otherwise specified” 
exception is not an all-or-nothing proposition.  Just because 
one subsection of § 1B1.3 does “not apply to a particular count 
of conviction does not mean that other subsections of the 
relevant conduct provision cannot be given effect.”  United 
States v. Maddox, 803 F.3d 1215, 1223 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 
Amendments made by the United States Sentencing 
Commission to § 1B1.3 after Kluger, and that were given effect 
prior to Metro’s sentencing, support our conclusion that 
§ 1B1.3 remains important even in an insider trading case.  The 
2015 version of § 1B1.3 amended subsection (a)(1)(B), the 
provision containing guidance on when a court is to hold a 
defendant accountable for the conduct of others “in the case of 
a jointly undertaken criminal activity[.]”  U.S.S.G. 
§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).  In the pre-2015 version of the guidelines 
that Kluger interpreted, that specific subsection instructed 
courts to hold defendants responsible “in the case of a jointly 
undertaken criminal activity (a criminal plan, scheme, 
endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert 
with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy)[] [for] all 
reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in 
furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity[.]”  
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (2011).  Following the 2015 
amendments, § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) now instructs courts to hold a 
defendant responsible, 
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in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal 
activity (a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or 
enterprise undertaken by the defendant in 
concert with others, whether or not charged as a 
conspiracy), [for] all acts and omissions of others 
that were— 
(i) within the scope of the jointly 
undertaken criminal activity, 
(ii) in furtherance of that criminal 
activity, and 
(iii) reasonably foreseeable in 
connection with that criminal 
activity[.] 
 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (2015). 
 
The amendment placed within the text of the guideline 
three distinct factors for courts to consider when conducting 
the § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) analysis.  By its own account, the 
Sentencing Commission amended the guideline to “clarify the 
use of relevant conduct in offenses involving multiple 
participants.”  U.S.S.G. Supp. to App. C, Amend. 790, Reason 
for Amend.  While the amendment did not signal a “substantive 
change in policy,” it did clarify that courts should go through a 
three-step analysis before attributing the conduct of others to a 
defendant facing sentencing.  Id.  That analysis requires courts 
to “(1) identify the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal 
activity; (2) determine whether the conduct of others in the 
jointly undertaken criminal activity was in furtherance of that 
criminal activity; and (3) determine whether the conduct of 
others was reasonably foreseeable in connection with that 
criminal activity.”  Id.  The main point of the amendment was 
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to take the “scope” step of the analysis out of the commentary 
and place it “in the text of the guideline itself.”  Id. 
 
Kluger had no occasion to address the “scope” of the 
jointly undertaken criminal activity because it was not disputed 
that the defendant was aware of, and acting with, the 
stockbroker.  722 F.3d at 559 n.13.  Rather, the Kluger Court’s 
analysis focused on whether conduct that was admittedly 
within the scope of and in furtherance of the jointly undertaken 
criminal activity also had to be foreseeable to be attributable to 
an insider-trading defendant.  Id. at 557-61.  In short, the 
question of scope was not on the table in Kluger, but it is here, 
and it may be in other insider trading cases. 
 
We therefore hold that § 1B1.3 remains relevant when 
attributing to an insider-trading defendant gains realized by 
other individuals.  Before attributing gains to a defendant under 
§ 2B1.4’s gain analysis, a sentencing court should first identify 
the scope of conduct for which the defendant can fairly be held 
accountable for sentencing purposes under § 1B1.3.  After 
identifying the scope of conduct, the court should then analyze 
that conduct to determine whom the defendant “act[ed] in 
concert with” and to whom he “provided inside information[.]”  
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.4 cmt. background.  That may lead the court to 
attribute to a defendant gains realized by downstream trading 
emanating from the defendant’s tips, but, depending on the 
facts established at sentencing, it may not.8  Kluger does not 
                                              
8  We emphasize that a defendant cannot artificially 
limit his sentencing exposure by utilizing a middleman to 
convey inside information to a third party to conduct illegal 
trades when that defendant had reason to know, or was 
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impose, as the government suggests, “what amounts to strict 
liability” on tippers, regardless of whether or not the tipper had 
any knowledge at the time he was providing the inside 
information that it would reach an individual other than the 
individual to whom he provided it.  (Answering Br. at 26.)  In 
fact, the government’s own argument to the District Court 
undercuts the position it has taken before us.  When asked by 
the District Court whether Metro had to “know of 
Mr. Eydelman in order to have” responsibility for Eydelman’s 
gains, the government answered that the law requires that 
Metro “know that there is somebody else that is obtaining the 
inside information that he is passing on.  And [the government 
has] to show that all three gentlemen were acting in concert.”  
(App. at 81-82.) 
 
Because “the attribution of gains to a defendant can be 
critical in a guidelines sentencing range calculation,” Kluger, 
722 F.3d at 556, the “strict liability” position now taken by the 
government runs the risk of sentences being imposed on 
defendants that are excessive in relation to their criminal 
conduct.9  Our holding today avoids that risk but remains fully 
                                              
willfully blind to the fact that, the middleman was passing the 
inside information to third parties. 
 
9  We are not alone in looking to § 1B1.3 to provide the 
proper analytical framework for assessing the scope of a 
defendant’s conduct for sentencing purposes in the insider 
trading context.  Other courts of appeals have looked to that 
provision for that purpose for decades.  United States v. 
Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1072-73 (10th Cir. 2009); United 
States v. O’Hagan, 139 F.3d 641, 655-56 (8th Cir. 1998); 
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in line with Kluger.  Once a sentencing court identifies the 
scope of conduct for which a defendant can be fairly held 
accountable, whether consequences flowing from that conduct 
were foreseeable is not pertinent to § 2B1.4’s gain analysis. 
 
C. The District Court Did Not Address Critical 
Factual Disputes Relevant to the Scope of 
Metro’s Conduct for Sentencing Purposes 
Since we have concluded that district courts must look 
to § 1B1.3 to determine the scope of conduct for which a 
defendant can be held accountable for sentencing purposes, we 
must now consider whether the District Court made “a 
searching and individualized inquiry into the circumstances 
surrounding [Metro’s] involvement in the conspiracy … to 
ensure that [Metro’s] sentence accurately reflect[ed] his … 
role.”  Collado, 975 F.2d at 995.  A district court does not meet 
that requirement if it fails to comply with the guidelines’ 
instruction to “resolve disputed sentencing factors at a 
sentencing hearing in accordance with [Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure] 32(i).”  U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(b).  That rule 
mandates that, “[a]t sentencing, the court … must – for any 
disputed portion of the presentence report or other controverted 
matter – rule on the dispute or determine that a ruling is 
unnecessary either because the matter will not affect 
sentencing, or because the court will not consider the matter in 
sentencing … .”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i).  The rule is “strictly 
enforced” and requires that “[a] finding on a disputed fact or a 
disclaimer of reliance upon a disputed fact … be expressly 
made.”  United States v. Electrodyne Sys. Corp., 147 F.3d 250, 
                                              
United States v. Stern, No. 92-3752, 1993 WL 82048, at *4 
(5th Cir. Mar. 12, 1993) (not precedential). 
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255 (3d Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Freeman, 763 
F.3d 322, 339 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[I]f a defendant disputes a fact 
included in the presentence investigation report, the sentencing 
court must either resolve that dispute or state that it will not 
rely on the disputed fact.” (citation omitted)).  A district court’s 
failure to comply with Rule 32(i)(3)(B) “is grounds for 
vacating the sentence.”  Electrodyne Sys., 147 F.3d at 255. 
 
The government offered only the January 28, 2014, 
transcript to establish its factual contentions.  Metro, for his 
part, clearly objected to the government’s position that he 
“acted in concert with” or “provided inside information” to 
Eydelman.  The District Court never resolved those factual 
disputes on the record; it simply overruled Metro’s objection 
and concluded that Kluger was controlling.  Had the Court’s 
assessment of Kluger been correct, it may have been justified 
in viewing as moot the factual disputes raised by Metro.  But, 
as we have discussed, the assessment was in error.  
Accordingly, the factual disputes are very much alive and the 
obligation of Rule 32(i)(3)(B) to resolve those disputes 
remains in force.   
 
When the scope of a defendant’s involvement in a 
conspiracy is contested, a district court cannot rely solely on a 
defendant’s guilty plea to the conspiracy charge, without 
additional fact-finding, to support attributing co-conspirators’ 
gains to a defendant.  Because the District Court here did not 
resolve the key factual dispute raised by Metro, or otherwise 
provide a factual basis to support its gain analysis, there was 
not the “searching and individualized inquiry” necessary to 
ensure Metro’s sentence matched his role in the conspiracy. 
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D. A Guilty Plea Alone Is Not Necessarily 
Determinative of Sentencing Accountability 
In reaching our conclusion, we do not imply that a 
defendant can contest at sentencing the factual averments 
contained in an indictment to which he pled guilty.  See United 
States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 177 n.1 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding 
that pleading guilty “binds [a defendant] to the accuracy of the 
facts set forth in the indictment”).  That issue is not before us 
today because the indictment to which Eydelman pled guilty 
contains no facts actually linking Metro to Eydelman.  Though 
it charged Metro with “knowingly and willfully combin[ing], 
conspir[ing] and agree[ing] with Tamayo, Eydelman, and 
others” to violate the securities laws, (App. at 26-27,) the 
indictment did not set out any factual basis showing that Metro 
“acted in concert with” or “provided inside information” to 
Eydelman for purposes of sentencing accountability.  
Similarly, the PSR does not contain any facts linking Metro to 
Eydelman, other than referring to the fact that Metro was 
charged with conspiring with Eydelman.  And although the 
government could have elicited facts from Metro at his plea 
hearing to tie him to Eydelman, it did not. 
 
On the contrary, at the plea hearing, the government 
established only that Metro learned about Eydelman after the 
insider trading activity had ended.10  It asked Metro whether he 
                                              
10  Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 instructs that 
“[b]efore entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must 
determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.”  Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 11(b)(3).  Here, rather than conducting the colloquy 
with Metro to determine whether there was a sufficient factual 
basis to support entering judgment on the guilty plea, the Court 
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“enter[ed] into an agreement with Frank Tamayo to engage in 
securities transactions based on material nonpublic 
information,” to which Metro responded, “Yes,” but it did not 
ask whether he entered into an agreement with Eydelman.  
(App. at 67.)  The government next asked whether Metro 
“disclose[d] the inside information to Tamayo,” to which 
Metro responded, “Yes.”  (App. at 67.)  It did not ask if he 
disclosed information to Eydelman.  The government asked 
whether, between February 2009 and January 2013, Metro 
“provide[d] Tamayo inside information related to at least 13 
different corporate transactions so that Tamayo could profit by 
trading on the inside information[,]” to which Metro 
responded, “Yes.”  (App. at 69.)  The government did not ask 
whether he provided that information with the intent that it 
reach Eydelman.  The government further asked, “[w]ith 
respect to the overt acts charged in the indictment, do you 
acknowledge that you and Frank Tamayo each had a defined 
role to perform certain specific acts in furtherance of your 
agreement to [violate the securities laws],” to which Metro 
replied, “Yes.”  (App. at 69.)  The government did not ask 
about Eydelman’s role, if any, in that agreement.  The only fact 
the government did elicit from Metro concerning Eydelman 
was that “[a]fter [his] arrest,” Metro “learn[ed] that Tamayo 
used a broker named Vladimir Eydelman[.]”  (App. at 69.) 
 
The government must prove facts supporting a 
sentencing enhancement by a preponderance of the evidence.  
United States v. Napolitan, 762 F.3d 297, 309 (3d Cir. 2014); 
United States v. Tai, 750 F.3d 309, 318-19 (3d Cir. 2014).  
Perhaps the District Court thought that the government had met 
                                              
requested the government to develop the factual basis by 
questioning Metro.   
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its burden to demonstrate that Metro “acted in concert with” or 
“provided inside information” to Eydelman, but the record 
gives us no basis to say that the Court indeed reached that 
conclusion.  In any event, the record is insufficient to support 
the sentence given. 
 
III. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate Metro’s 
sentence and remand the case for resentencing after the District 
Court has determined whether the government has established 
by a preponderance of the evidence that Metro “acted in 
concert with” or “provided inside information” to Eydelman.  
The Court is free to reopen the record, should it determine that 
further development of the record is in order. 
